In this paper we explore the constraints that our preferred account of scientific representation places on the ontology of scientific models. Pace the Direct Representation view associated with Arnon Levy and Adam Toon we argue that scientific models should be thought of as imagined systems, and clarify the relationship between imagination and representation.
properties. An Interpretation I is a bijective function I :O → Z . 8 The plasticine rope becomes a protein-representation by mapping plasticine-rope-properties onto proteinproperties: we associate the rope with the amino chain, the shape of the rope with the shape of the amino chain, and so on. We therefore say that a Z-representation is a pair X, I , where X is an O-object, and I is an interpretation.
We now identify scientific models with Z-representations in the following manner: a model is a Z-representation where X is an O-object that is used as the vehicle of the model in a certain context (either due to convention or the stipulation of a scientist, or group thereof) and I is an interpretation. We then write M = X, I and also speak of a Z-model. So the plasticine-on-sticks-system becomes a protein-model when endowed with an interpretation.
It is a deliberate choice that this definition of a model contains no reference to a target system. There are models that don't have target systems, and therefore we should distinguish between the notions of being a scientific model and being a scientific representation. Some Z-models are also representations of a Z, others aren't.
Kendrew's protein-model is also representation-of protein. Maxwell's aether-model is not a representation-of aether, but it is an aether-representation nevertheless.
Exemplification is a mode of reference that occurs when an object refers to a property it instantiates. This is established relative to a context. We can define it as follows: X exemplifies P in a certain context C iff X instantiates P and the context highlights a property, where a property is highlighted if it is identified in the context as relevant and epistemically accessible to users of X. An item that exemplifies a property is an exemplar. Consider, for example, a sample of granite you see in a kitchen showroom. The sample instantiates the specific colour of the stone, and the context highlights this property. Instantiation is therefore a necessary condition for 8 If an O-property is quantitative (for instance, being x m long or being curved by α degrees), the interpretation also contains a function associating the values of the Oproperty with the values of the corresponding Z-property. In simple cases these functions are just scale transformations.
exemplification. But the converse does not hold: not every property that is instantiated is also exemplified. Exemplification is selective. The sample block exemplifies being made out of granite, but not rectangularity, being six inches long, and being stored next to the Corian sample, even though it instantiates all these properties. Only selected properties are exemplified, and which properties are selected depends on the context.
Models are Z-representations and so we want them to be able to exemplify Zproperties. Our model is a myoglobin-representation which we take to exemplify properties like forming a flat disk of dimensions about 43Å×35Å×23Å. But the properties in the codomain of the interpretation aren't instantiated and hence cannot be exemplified whenever O ≠ Z . To fix this problem we introduce the notion of I-
instantiation: M = X, I I-instantiates a Z-property P iff X instantiates O-property P'
and P' is mapped onto P under I. This allows a model to I-instantiate properties that it does not instantiate. As a consequence, when we say that a model has property P we say something that is not genuinely true (because X does not instantiate P). The notion of I-instantiation and the associated notion of 'truth under an interpretation' need some unpacking, and we come back to this issue in Section 5 where we offer an account of these notions in terms of make-believe. For now we can think of it in terms of the association of properties with each other without detriment. We can now say that a model I-exemplifies properties that it I-instantiates and that have been highlighted in the context under consideration.
Equipped with this definition of a model we now analyse the notion of representation-as in a scientific context. For a model to represent a target as Z two further conditions have to hold. The first is that the model denote its target system.
Denotation is the core of representation. It establishes representation-of. Nevertheless it is only necessary and not sufficient for representation-as. Denotation does not explain how M can be used to learn about T, but it is a hallmark feature of models that if they represent a target, they do so in a way that allows us to perform formulate claims about the target based on the model. This is where the second condition comes into play. The basic idea is that properties I-exemplified by the model are imputed onto the target. Imputation can be analysed in terms of stipulation. The model user may simply stipulate that the Iexemplified properties hold in the target system, and this is what establishes that the model represents the target as having those properties.
But the properties imputed are rarely exactly those I-exemplified by the model. The model could, for instance, I-exemplify being frictionless, but the property imputed to the target is something like 'having sufficiently low friction to be negligible in the current context'. In some cases the imputed properties could diverge significantly from those I-exemplified by the model. It is therefore crucial that the relation between them is articulated with precision. For this reason we build an explicit specification of how the I-exemplified properties are related to properties imputed into our account of scientific representation by means of a 'key'. Let P 1 , …, P n be the Z-properties I-exemplified by the model, and let Q 1 , …, Q m be the properties that the model imputes to T (n and m are positive natural numbers which can but need not be equal). Then the representation must come with a key K specifying how exactly P 1 , …, P n are converted into Q 1 , …, Q m . Borrowing notation from algebra we can write the key as a function K taking I-exemplified properties as arguments and mapping them onto to-be-imputed properties: K({P 1 , ..., P n }) = {Q 1 , ..., Q m } .
In the case of the plasticine model, the key allows some flexibility between the properties directly I-exemplified by the protein model and those that are imputed onto Myoglobin itself. Although the plasticine rope in the model is a rope of uniform width throughout the model, Kendrew explicitly imputed a different property onto the molecule "as it is at corners that the chain must lose the tightly packed configuration that makes it visible at this resolution" and proposed that perhaps 70% of the chain was an α -helix whilst the rest was fully extended (Kendrew et al. 1960, 665) .
Likewise, it is unlikely that Kendrew was confident that the 43Å×35Å×23Å dimensions exactly corresponded to the dimensions of the molecule. There were clear margins for error in the process leading to the construction of the molecule, so it is more likely that something like 'being a flat disk of 43Å±10%×35Å±10%×23Å±10% dimensions' was imputed.
Gathering together the pieces we have discussed yields the DEKI account of representation: Let M = X, I be a model, where X is an O-object that serves as the vehicle of the model and I is an interpretation. Let T be the target system. M represents T as Z iff all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) M denotes T (and in some cases parts of M denote parts of T).
(ii) M I-exemplifies Z-properties P 1 , ..., P n .
(iii) M comes with key K associating the set {P 1 , ..., P n } with a set of properties The account owes its name to the key ingredients: denotation, exemplification, keying up, imputation. Understanding how these conditions are met in the case of the plasticine model illustrates how our account works. X is a plasticine-on-sticks object (O), which is endowed with an interpretation I associating plasticine-properties withprotein properties. X and I together form a protein-model. The model denotes myoglobin, which makes it a representation-of myoglobin. The model also Iexemplifies protein properties in virtue of the research context highlighting them, for instance consisting of two layers of chains (P 1 ), forming a flat disk of dimensions about 43Å x 35Å x 23Å (P 2 ), and having a uniform configuration throughout (P 3 ).
These properties are related to other properties with key K: identity in case of P 1 , applying with a tolerance threshold of around 10% in the case of P 2 and only applying to straight lengths of the polypeptide chain in the case of P 3 . So the model imputes consisting of two layers of chains (Q 1 ); being a flat disk of dimensions 43Å±10%×35Å±10%×23Å±10% (Q 2 ); and having a uniform configuration in only 70% of the chain (Q 3 ) to the target T. These conditions establish how the hose model (M), represents myoglobin (T), as being a protein with such and such a tertiary structure (Z).
From Plasticine Ropes to Immortal Rabbits
The DEKI account explains how a material object becomes a model and how a model represents a target system. The explanation it offers makes use of the material constitution of the vehicle X in that X is said to instantiate properties, and these properties are crucial to generate knowledge about the target. But DEKI is not the only account of representation to emphasise the objectual character of models. When introducing the DDI account of representation, Hughes observes that a model is a "secondary object that has, so to speak, a life of its own" and that "the representation has an internal dynamic whose effects we can examine" (1997, 331), and Weisberg (2007) sees the introduction of a model system that is distinct from the target as one of the defining aspects of the practice of modelling.
As long as models are material objects this is unproblematic. But many scientific models are not material objects. Newton's model of the sun-earth system consists of two perfect spheres with a homogeneous mass distribution gravitationally exemplified properties with properties to be imputed onto a real target system. But how can we compare something non-concrete with a concrete target? Likewise, we also compare models with other models, and so we would like an account of comparative statements to covers model comparisons as well.
Applicability of mathematics. Many models are mathematized, and mathematics plays a prominent role in many modelling projects. How are we to make sense of the contribution that mathematics makes to scientific representation?
Getting Started on the Wrong Foot?
The list of issues in the last section is no small feat. Addressing these challenges gets us into discussions of abstract objects, fictional characters, the metaphysics of properties, the nature of mathematical entities, and a number of other unfathomable problems. So one might argue that we got started on the wrong foot and should rework the notion of representation in a way that avoids these problems.
This is the project of Toon (2010; and Levy (2012; 2015) . Toon Toon and Levy articulate this basic idea within the framework of Walton's (1990) theory of make-believe (MB). At the heart of this theory is the notion of a game of make-believe. The simplest examples of these games are children's plays (ibid., 11). In one such play we imagine that stumps are bears and if we spot a stump we imagine that we spot a bear. In Walton's terminology the stumps are props, and the rule that we imagine a bear when we see a stump is a principle of generation.
Together a prop and principle of generation prescribe what is to be imagined. If a proposition is prescribed to be imagined in a game of make believe, then it is fictional The crucial move now is to say that models are props in games of make believe. Material models are like the statue of Napoleon (ibid., 37). Kendrew's plasticine rope is a prop in a game of make-believe prescribing those involved in the game to imagine certain things about myoglobin. Non-concrete models are like the text of The War of the Worlds: they are descriptions that mandate the reader to imagine certain things about the target system (ibid., 39-40). A model of the ideal pendulum, for instance, is a description that prescribes us to imagine that the target, the real ball and spring system we have in front of us, is exactly as the text presents it:
we have to imagine the spring as perfectly elastic and the bob as a point mass. Using
Toon's own terminology we call this account Direct Representation.
This account is more parsimonious than DEKI. Representation is explained in terms of there being the prescription to imagine certain things about the target, thus getting rid of denotation, exemplification and keys. At the same time vehicles, understood as 'secondary systems', are rendered otiose, which dissolves any metaphysical questions about these systems.
There is no austerity programme without casualties, and Direct Representation is no exception. A defining feature of scientific modelling is that models allow us to perform surrogative reasoning (cf. Swoyer 1991): we can use a model to (attempt to) learn about its target systems. It is unclear how this this is done in Toon's framework.
Imagining that a target has a certain feature tells us nothing about whether or not we should import that feature, or some other, onto the target system itself. Imagining the pendulum bob to be a point mass tells us nothing about which, if any, claims about point masses we should take to be true of the real bob. One can imagine almost anything about almost any object, but unless there is criterion telling us which of these imaginings should be regarded as true of the target, these imaginings don't licence any surrogative reasoning.
At one place Toon suggest that principles of generation fit the bill: "principles of generation often link properties of models to properties of the system they represent in rather direct way. If the model has a certain property then we are to imagine that system does too" (2012, (68) (69) . At least within Walton's framework that isn't the case: principles of generation generate a set of fictional propositions and leave it unspecified whether or not they should also be taken to be true of the target.
One could consider extending the framework by building a fictional-to-truth inference rule into it, but that would be a Pyrrhic victory. What a model (or model-description) prescribes us to imagine rarely, if ever, corresponds exactly to what a competent model user claims about the target itself. Neither did Newton take the real sun to be a perfect sphere; nor did Fibonacci believe for a moment that rabbits were immortal.
Many model-properties are imputed to targets only after having undergone transformations, which often involve de-idealisation and approximation. DEKI accounts for these transformations in the key, but Direct Representation leaves the transfer mechanism between model and target unspecified. Levy (2015) explicitly identifies this as a gap in Toon's account, and sets about to fill it. In his (2012, 744) he proposed that the problem be conceptualised in analogy with metaphors, but immediately added that this was only a beginning which requires substantial elaboration. In his (2015, (792) (793) (794) (795) (796) he takes a different route and appeals to Yablo's (2014) theory of partial truth. The core idea of this view is that a statement is partially true "if it is true when evaluated only relative to a subset of the circumstances that make up its subject matter -the subset corresponding to the relevant content-part" (Levy 2015, 792) . The ideal gas model, for instance, prescribes us to imagine all kind of things we know full well to be false (for instance that gas molecules don't collide) and yet the model "is partially true and partially untrue: true with respect to the role of energy distribution, but false with respect to the role of collisions" (2015, 793) . This is a step forward, but it does not take us all the way. Levy himself admits that there are other sorts of cases that don't fit the mould (ibid., 794). Such cases often are ones in which distortive idealisations are crucial and cannot be set aside. These Dracula. If a model has no real-world target, then it is about a fictional character. As
Toon admits, this "gives rise to all the usual problems with fictional characters" (ibid.). So at least in the case of targetless models Direct Representation is not ontologically parsimonious.
Levy (2015) offers a different and radical solution to the problem of models without targets: there aren't any! He first broadens the notion of a target system, allowing for models that are only loosely connected to targets (ibid., 796-797). To this end he appeals to Godfrey-Smith's notion of "hub-and-spoke" cases: families of models where only some have a target (which makes them the hub models) and the others are connected to them via conceptual links (spokes) but don't have specific targets. Levy points out that in such cases models should be understood as having a generalised target. If something that looks like a model doesn't meet the requirement of having at least a generalised target, then it's not a model at all. Levy mentions structures like the game of life and observes that they are "bits of mathematics" rather than models (ibid., 797). This is supposed to eliminate the need for fictional characters in the case of targetless models.
The core idea of Direct Representation is that a model is nothing but an act of imagining something about a concrete object. However, generalised targets such as population growth are not concrete things, and often not even classes of such things.
But one cannot reap the ontological benefits of a view that analyses modelling in terms of imaginings about concrete things and at the same time introduce targets that are no longer concrete. Furthermore, the claim that models without targets are 'just mathematics' does not come out looking very natural when we look back at the above examples. Ontological costs can't be avoided.
Another argument in favour of the direct framework is that imagining something about a concrete object is different from imagining something about a nonconcrete object, and that this difference matters to the practice of modelling. 10 To imagine that St Paul's Cathedral in London is attacked by aliens is different from imagining that a cathedral somewhere is attacked. As a real object the Cathedral has myriad of properties, and at least some of them are known to us. By having imaginings about the Cathedral fact about the Cathedral enter the imagination. So the focus on a real object makes a crucial contribution to the content of our imaginings. Cathedral is that the 'extra content' is not provided by knowing the object, or even being acquainted with it, but by background theories, and these figure in the principles of generation. So when we learn that there is no aether, the imaginings that constitute the aether model don't change. Of course the presence or absence of a target matters to many other issues, most notably surrogative reasoning (there is nothing to reason about if there is no target!), but it seems to have little, if any, importance for how we imaginatively engage with the scenario presented to us in a model.
We conclude that Direct Representation isn't viable. It has problems
explaining how surrogative reasoning with models works; the way that it deals with targetless models jars with its ontological motivations; and targets are imaginatively inefficacious. We submit that DEKI is the more promising option and now turn to the challenges introduced in Section 3. In doing so we will also use the framework of MB, but in a different way and to different ends.
Rising to the Challenge
The DEKI account itself places no restriction on the choice of the vehicle X.
Anything that is an object with properties can, in principle, be used as a vehicle of representation. In particular, there is nothing in DEKI per se that would rule out set theoretical structures, and DEKI could in principle be used to articulate a structuralist theory of representation. This, however, is not the route we want to take. Many models have important non-structural aspects, and these are best understood as being fictional in some sense. 12 Our goal in this section is two-fold. First, we aim to articulate in what sense models are fictions and how they can play the role of a vehicle as required in DEKI. Our approach also uses MB, but in a different way than Direct Representation. Second, we aim to show that MB in fact offers a comprehensive framework in which to think about modelling that also covers material models of the kind discussed in Section 2.
Let us begin by having another look at material models. In Section 2 we said that a model is an O-object X endowed with an interpretation I that maps O-properties onto Z-properties. This fits seamlessly into MB: the model object X can be seen as a prop in a game of make-believe and the interpretation I provides principles of generation. A model, understood as the pair M = X, I , is then equivalent to prop and set of principles of generation mandating model users to imagine certain things in response to certain features of X. On that reading, Kendrew's plasticine rope is a prop in the myoglobin-game-of-make-believe, a game in which we are prescribed to imagine certain myoglobin-properties when confronted with certain plasticine-ropeproperties (and which properties are so prescribed to be imagined is specified by I).
Putting material models into the context of MB is not merely conceptual retrofitting. This move helps highlighting important aspects of the practice of modelling. Models are not for passive contemplation. Kendrew learned with his model by manipulating it, by experimenting on it, and by intervening into its internal mechanics. At the same time the engagement with the model object is guided by the interpretation. He did not just toy around with plasticine aimlessly; he specifically explored those plasticine properties that were covered by his interpretation. This is exactly what happens in a game of make-believe. We're not just aimlessly walking through the forest; we actively look for stumps and disregard other things because they are not covered by the rule of generation and hence not part of the game.
population mandates participants in the game of make believe to imagine rabbits with certain specific features, and they then use principles of generation to draw conclusions that have not been written explicitly into the original model description, for instance that the rabbit population grows monotonically and is unbounded.
In contrast with Direct Representation we don't analyse model descriptions as prescribing imaginings about a concrete target. A model description prescribes us to imagine certain things, and these are prima facie independent of the presence (or absence) of a target. By mandating those involved in a certain game to imagine certain things, the model description generates the imagined-object that serves as the vehicle X of a representation-as. In our examples, Newton's spherical planets and
Fibonacci's immortal rabbits take the place of Kendrew's plasticine rope in the DEKI scheme. So MB's answer to the question at the beginning of Section 3 is that in the case of non-concrete models imagined-objects take the place of X in the DEKI conditions.
The hyphen in 'imagined-object' indicates that we use this locution as a term of art. The reason for this is that we want to remain ontologically non-committal.
Game-driven make-believe can be seen as a way to refer to, or even create, a
Meinongian fictional entity (Priest 2011) , as a method to create an abstract artefact of the kind Thomasson (1999) describes, or simply as inducing mental content in those who play the game. DEKI is compatible with all these options and hence as far as DEKI is concerned there is no need to adjudicate between them.
14 Imagined-objects are independent of targets. The plasticine rope mandates those playing the game to imagine an alpha helix that is folded up in space in certain claim is that model descriptions function like texts of that kind and that therefore MB offers a good account of them. 14 This is not say that different options raise different issues when the details of the account are developed. Our own preference is for an antirealist option where no object is introduced. This option raises questions about the intersubjective identification of characters or things referred to by fictional names. For a discussion of this problem and a solution see Salis (2013) .
way. That this is imagined about a real target is not part of the game. Indeed, had it come to light later that myoglobin was to share the fate of phlogiston or the luminiferous aether, the imaginings prescribed by Kendrew's model would remain exactly the same (for the reasons mentioned at the end of Section 4).
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MB is attractive for DEKI because it offers a detailed account of constrained imagination that naturally accommodates important aspects of the practice of modelling. Scientists often start with few basic posits, make certain assumptions, rely (often tacitly) on background theories. By actively manipulating these elements under certain constraints, and by seeing what fits together and how, they learn about the posits and about what they imply. This activity is naturally analysed as being involved in a game of make-believe, and in doing so an imagined-object is explored. Due to the use of principles of generation the imagined-object can have properties that have not been written into the original model description, which is why the study of imaginedobjects is cognitively relevant. By being involved in such games physicists learn about the geometrical properties of orbits and population biologists about growth of populations, neither of which were explicitly mentioned in the model description.
Games of make believe associated with non-concrete models are more complex than those of material models. The reason is that they do two things at once. In the concrete case X is a physical object and claims about X are true or false; the imagination only comes into play when explaining how X becomes a Z-15 Imagination need not be pictorial and a view that sees imagination as central to modelling is not committed to the (absurd) claim that all model-based reasoning is pictorial (Salis and Frigg forthcoming) . Neither is modelling bound by constraints of possibility. A venerable tradition sees imaginabiliy as a guide to possibility. We do not assume such 'thick' notion of imagination here and there is no presupposition that only possible things, or indeed only consistent things, can be imagined. Models can, at least in principle, contain inconsistencies and the notion of imagination involved in MB should not rule this out. For a discussion of the relation between possibility and imagination see Yablo (1993) and Szabo Gendler and Hawthorne (2002) . Finally, we do not have to commit to any particular view of mental content on which, again, nothing hangs as far as DEKI is concerned. model. In fact in many cases the imagined-object of the model is chosen so that it has the properties we are interested in, and the interpretation becomes a simple identity. In Fibonacci's model, for instance, the imagined-object specified by D X is a rabbit population and the model is a rabbit-population-representation. So the interpretation part is reduced to identity (but not so the key: the properties of Fibonacci's fictional rabbits are not imputed unchanged to real rabbits). This is because the imagination is less constrained than the material world and so it's often easier to find a suitable imagined-object than to come by an appropriate material system. For this reason nonconcrete models have identity interpretations more often than material models. But identity interpretations are not a prerogative of non-material models. Scale models are material models with such interpretations, for instance when a small ship is used as a ship-model.
Let us now turn to the challenges from Section 3. As pointed out above, MB offers an analysis of truth in fiction in terms of being fictional in a story and an account of models based on MB can inherit this to explain truth in vehicles. It is then true that Fibonacci's rabbit population grows monotonically iff it is fictional in the Fibonacci game of make-believe that the population grows monotonically, i.e., iff the prop of the model together with the principles of generation prescribes us to imagine the population as growing monotonically. Two models are then identical iff the same propositions are fictional in them. Property attribution is then pretend attribution: the imagined-object that plays the role of X has property P iff it is fictional in the model that X has P. Nothing in DEKI depends on there being a real object that literally instantiates a physical property. What matter is that there is right and wrong in property attribution, and MB explains constraints to imagination cogently in terms of facts about the prop and adherence to principles of generation. MB also offers an epistemology for model systems: exploring a model amounts to figuring out what follows from the basic assumptions and the principles of generation. Highlighting is explained in the same way as in the case of concrete models.
Comparing models and targets is common in many contexts, which raises the question of how one can compare an imagined-object and real thing. This question has no straightforward answer and much depends on one's ontological commitments.
We refer the reader to Salis (2016) for an in-depth discussion of the problem and a proposed solution. It is worth noting, however, that DEKI itself does not require comparative claims. The fourth condition in DEKI is that properties are imputed to the target. In linguistic terms this means that claims of the form 'target T has property Q' are put forward. These are standard attributive claims rather than comparisons, and as such they raise no problems having to with fiction.
Mathematics can enter models in two places: in the model descriptions and in the rules of generation. Mathematical concepts can be part of descriptions or rules like the topography of a city can be part of a novel. Often the specification of a vehicle already involves mathematical concepts, for instance when we specify that a perfect sphere is part of the vehicle. So the language in which D X is formulated contains mathematical terms. The principles of generation also contain mathematical rules. In Fibonacci's case basic arithmetic concepts are used in D X and the rules of generation applied in the model contain full-fledged arithmetic, which is used to generate the population size numbers at later times (which are not part of the model description).
In other cases the principles of generation contain mathematically formulated laws of nature that are assumed to be operable in the model. In Newton's model, for instance, the two bodies are assumed to be governed by Newton's equation of motion, with the mathematical principle being used to find that it is fictional in the model that planets move in elliptical orbits. These rules are independent from D X and can be changed.
This happened, for instance, when, without changing D X , Newton's equation is replaced by Schrödinger's equation to generate secondary truths about the two-body system.
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The last item left from our list is denotation. At this point we can only gesture at the problem and will have to leave a serious discussion for another day. Denotation by itself is formidable problem, and in the current context an additional complication is thrown into the mix. While denotation is standardly construed as relation between a symbol and an object ('Julius Caesar' denotes the historical figure Julius Caesar), it is here construed as relation between a model and target. Those who opt for realism about models will have to say what exactly they are and explain how the denotation of a fictional entity is established. Those who remain antirealists about models will have to offer an account that involves the imagination in various ways and in various places. Both options are possible, but neither is straightforward. A promising antirealist account has been offered by (Salis m.s.) , and we are hopeful that an account along those lines will eventually answer the question. 16 We here explain how mathematics enters modelling understood as analysed in MB.
This does not address the fundamental issue of the 'problem of the applicability of mathematics', the question of how it is possible that mathematical properties can be attributed to something non-mathematical. Different solutions have been proposed (see Shapiro (2000) for a survey) and while the issue is important in its own right, DEKI is in principle compatible with any answer and hence there is no need to take a stance here.
The considerations show that MB provides a unified framework for thinking about modelling, both concrete and non-concrete. It offers solutions to a number of problems and casts an interesting light on others, which will, we hope, advance future discussions.
